Again in 2020, we encountered Gustafson v. Springfield, Inc., 2020 Pa. Tremendous. Lexis 843 (Pa. Tremendous. Sept. 20, 2020), a choice so weird that it reminded us of a Monty Python film. That call “make use of[ed] a rationale, without delay each paleolithically conservative and pro-plaintiffly radical, that might render any federal “tort reform” statute unconstitutional.” Gustafson concerned a federal statute that preempted most tort litigation involving firearms, the Safety of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act of 2005, 15 U.S.C. §§7901, et seq., (“PLCAA”), and declared that the PLCAA violated the Tenth Modification.
Because it didn’t contain prescription medical product legal responsibility litigation, the Weblog didn’t observe Gustafson all that intently – our final point out of it was in 2021, noting that en banc reargument had been granted and the singular panel opinion had been withdrawn. Nevertheless, the choice that resulted from the reargument was a large number. Gustafson v. Springfield, Inc., 282 A.3d 739 (Pa. Tremendous. 2022) (en banc), produced no majority and 5 totally different opinions from the 9 judges. Furthermore, the general outcome, which was to reverse the trial court docket’s dismissal of the swimsuit, was opposite to the bulk votes of the person judges. How may that be? Right here’s a quick description from a Pennsylvania appellate process article Bexis wrote about Gustafson:
The result in Gustafson thus differed dramatically from the votes of the 9 en banc judges on the deserves of the 2 points. The result was 5-4 in favor of reversal, as 4 judges would reverse on constitutional grounds, and one choose would reverse solely on statutory grounds. On each of the 2 points, nevertheless, the place advocated by the defendants was within the majority. Seven justices agreed that, factually, the Arms Act was relevant to the Gustafson plaintiffs’ claims. By a slimmer margin of 5-4, a majority of the Gustafson judges agreed that the Arms Act was constitutional.
J. Beck, “What Occurs When Precedent Splinters? A Take a look at Gustafson,” Regulation.com (Nov. 17, 2022).
This weird outcome had one useful impact, it nearly pressured the Pennsylvania Supreme Courtroom to take the inevitable attraction with a purpose to clear up the mess. Which it did. See Gustafson v. Springfield, Inc., 296 A.3d 560 (Pa. 2023) (granting overview).
And final month, the Pennsylvania Supreme Courtroom did certainly clear up the mess. See Gustafson v. Springfield, Inc., 2025 Pa. Lexis 442 (Pa. March 31, 2025).
We didn’t have lots of curiosity within the preemption facet of Gustafson, since solely categorical preemption was at challenge, and the PLCAA’s preemption language just isn’t just like any of the FDCA’s categorical preemption language. Certainly, the amicus transient Bexis co-wrote (with Matt Vodzak) in Gustafson solely addressed the constitutional challenge. However the Pennsylvania Supreme Courtroom’s Gustafson choice really overperformed on preemption – from our perspective. The choice acknowledges the demise of the presumption towards preemption in categorical preemption circumstances
[W]hen a Congressional statute comprises an categorical preemption clause, courts don’t invoke any presumption towards pre-emption. Immediately, we discover that the PLCAA comprises such an categorical preemption clause, which explicitly preempts state legislation relative to certified civil legal responsibility actions. Thus, we don’t apply any presumption towards preemption and, as a substitute, give attention to the PLCAA’s plain language.
Id. at *19 (citations and citation marks omitted) (emphasis added).
To any extent further we’ll be citing this holding from Gustafson, along with the Supreme Courtroom case it quoted and adopted, Commonwealth of Puerto Rico v. Franklin California Tax-free Belief, 579 U.S. 115, 125 (2016), in any categorical preemption briefing in Pennsylvania state court docket. It shouldn’t be crucial, given the USA Supreme Courtroom holding, but when the Third Circuit can ignore the Supreme Courtroom, and never thoughts protruding like a sore thumb, then we may see among the Pennsylvania judiciary doing the identical – however not after Gustafson confirmed the presumption’s demise.
In any case, 4 judges on the Gustafson en banc panel purchased an unprecedented argument that the Tenth Modification one way or the other makes all federal tort reform unconstitutional. Fortuitously, cooler heads prevailed – unanimously – on the Pennsylvania Supreme Courtroom. First, the court docket adopted the “presumption of constitutionality.” 2025 Pa. Lexis 442, at *43. Subsequent, it discovered that the federal structure’s Commerce Clause was lots broad sufficient to cowl categorical preemption of state common-law claims. This analysis doesn’t happen in a vacuum; fairly Congress has appreciable leeway. “[W]e are usually not required to find out if a regulated exercise really has a considerable impact on interstate commerce, however solely whether or not a rational foundation exists for thus concluding.” Id. at *49 (quotation and citation marks omitted). Right here, the “interstate nature of the [regulated] business can’t be disputed,” for the reason that product was made in a single state however bought and brought about hurt in one other. Id. at 49-50. “Underneath these circumstances, . . . it was cheap for Congress to conclude that these fits would financially affect the firearms business.” Id. at *50 (quotation omitted). “Congress rigorously crafted the PLCAA to make sure the Act solely barred fits that straight concerned merchandise and defendants engaged in interstate commerce.” Id. at *52 (quotation omitted). The statute’s definitions ensured that it “require[d] exercise in interstate commerce to have already occurred,” and thus did “not compel anybody” to create the commerce that it regulated. Id. at *53.
As a result of the PLCAA’s preemption of state tort legislation was inside Congress’ Commerce Clause energy, the Tenth Modification, which applies solely to “powers not delegated to the USA,” couldn’t contact it. Id. (quoting U.S. Const. modification X). “[N]umerous courts” had already “rejected arguments that the PLCAA violates the Tenth Modification.” It didn’t “commandeer” Pennsylvania or every other state to do something “affirmative,” solely to chorus from entertaining sure varieties of product legal responsibility lawsuits. Id. at *56-57.
Likewise, the plaintiffs’ (and the unique Superior Courtroom opinion’s) reliance on Erie Railroad v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938) – ordinarily one of many Weblog’s favourite circumstances – was not nicely taken. Erie merely requires software of present state legislation in range circumstances. Id. at 63-64. Gustafson was by no means even in federal court docket. The choice acknowledged, that instantly earlier than the Erie quote that plaintiffs touted was the phrase: “[e]xcept in issues ruled by the Federal Structure or by acts of Congress” – exactly the area of interest for any federal tort reform statute. Id. at *58 (emphasis unique). Federal acts are “enforced over relevant state legislation pursuant to the Supremacy Clause.” Id. (footnote omitted):
To the extent the PLCAA requires state judges to dismiss civil actions that would in any other case proceed underneath state legislation, that requirement doesn’t violate the anticommandeering doctrine, however is fairly a product of the Supremacy Clause.
Id. That’s to say, preemption correctly applies. States are usually not commandeered. They continue to be free to enact or create any state legislation they need – topic to the preemptive energy of this (or every other) congressional statute.
[T]he PLCAA doesn’t bar states from enacting any legislation and as a substitute merely preempts state legislation in relation to certified civil legal responsibility actions. . . . Underneath the PLCAA state legislatures stay free to move any statute they deem applicable, whereas the [PLCAA] doesn’t restrict states’ means to acknowledge new causes of motion by way of frequent legislation. Nor does the predicate exception prohibit states from deciphering state statutes by way of their courts.. . . . States stay free, both by way of their legislatures or their courts, to acknowledge any reason behind motion they deem applicable. All of the PLCAA . . ., does is preempt sure causes of actions.
Id. at *60-61 (citations omitted).
Lastly, the Supremacy Clause demonstrates that federalism doesn’t give states the unfettered energy to impose tort legal responsibility that plaintiffs claimed. Federal preemption applies underneath the PLCAA (and customarily) towards “tort actions no matter what department creates them. It doesn’t matter if they’re developed by the court docket or codified by the legislature.” Id. at *65 (quotation and citation marks omitted). Preemptive statutes thus have “no affect on how states select to allocate their lawmaking authority.” Id. at *66.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Courtroom’s Gustafson opinion was unanimous. That court docket has a well-deserved pro-plaintiff repute, however even it balked the notion that the Tenth Modification one way or the other precludes Congress from limiting state common-law tort litigation by way of preemptive statutes. We hope that Gustafson is the ultimate nail within the coffin of that weird thought, the antediluvian views of a handful of legislation faculty professors (2023 Pa S. Ct. Briefs Lexis 179) however.